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“DISHONESTY” IN FACT: THE FUTURE UNCERTAINTY OF
MARYLAND’S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF GOOD
FAITH & ENCOURAGING LAX LENDER LIABILITY
KARA N. ACHILIHU
Commercial law, ever-present in most aspects of people’s modern
lives, is an intricate system of laws that governs businesses, commerce, and
consumer transactions.1 The Uniform Commercial Code, originally published in 1952, serves as a vessel for commercially related transactions occurring in the United States—transcribing measures and policies for consumers, merchants, and institutions alike to follow.2 Each separate article
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC” or “Code”) addresses a particular area of commercial law, and Article 1 sets the stage for how those principles of interpretation are to be made.3 Article 1 contains the two-prong
definition of good faith—“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing”—which relates to the Code-wide obligation of good faith.4 Notably, the good faith standard regulates the behavior of commercial machines such as banks, which continue to gain negative press for malfeasance against customers.5
Although the Uniform Commercial Code is not federal law, all fifty
states have adopted this model set of laws; thus, nearly all states closely follow its provisions and amendments within their own statutory schemes.6
Exceptions do exist, however. Maryland is one of the few states that have
yet to adopt the two-prong standard of good faith, leaving the Maryland
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3. See infra Part I.A.2.
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Uniform Commercial Code’s definition as merely “honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned.”7
Part I of this Comment begins by exploring the origins and legislative
history of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 Part I also delves into the development of Article 1’s good faith standard—both through the subjective
and objective characterization—and how such changes shifted to other Articles.9 Next, this Comment presents Maryland’s “version” of the UCC, including its departure from the Uniform Commercial Code’s homogenous
definition of good faith, leaving the sole “honesty in fact” definition.10 A
brief summary of cases decided under both the subjective and subjectiveobjective standard will follow, analyzing the various consequences in a
banking context specifically.11
Part II of this Comment presents arguments in favor of the Maryland
General Assembly adopting the Uniform Commercial Code’s amendment
to Article 1 in its entirety for the sake of promoting commercial uniformity
with other states,12 clarity on how the judicial application of the standard
should occur,13 and fairness to consumers and others involved in relationships with banks.14 In conclusion, this Comment recommends that the
Maryland General Assembly adopt the Uniform Commercial Code’s
amendment to Article 1’s definition of good faith to include the “observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”15
I. BACKGROUND
Part I.A of this Comment explores the history of the Uniform Commercial Code, beginning with its distinctive contributors and commentators.16 Part I.A then discusses the introduction of good faith as a standard
within Article 1 and its trajectory throughout other Articles.17 Next, Part
I.B focuses on the enactment Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code and
the good faith standard under Title 1, Maryland’s version of Article 1.18
Part I.B also describes the Maryland General Assembly’s 2012 amendment
to Title 1 via passage of House Bill 700 and its ultimate effect on other Ti-

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part I.A.2.
See infra Part I.A.1.
See infra Part I.A.2.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.A.1.
See infra Part I.A.2.
See infra Part I.B.1.

AchilihuFinalBookProof (Do Not Delete)

6/25/2018 11:01 AM

1206

[VOL. 77:1204

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

tles.19 Finally, Part I.C briefly compares cases, in a lender liability framework, decided both under the sole subjective standard of good faith and the
two-prong standard containing both honesty in fact and observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, to provide context to the outcomes under both standards.20
A. The History of the Uniform Commercial Code
1. From Scattered Transactions to the Uniform Commercial Code:
How Private Organizations and Practitioners Shaped the
Future of Commercial Law
In 1942, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), also known
as the Uniform Law Commission, began a joint project of drafting the
UCC.21 Prior to the enactment of the UCC, commercial transactions were
mostly regulated by uniform laws prepared and promulgated by the
NCCUSL.22 While those uniform laws were either adopted in every state or
followed to a substantial degree by others, each law became engrained in
statutes related to commercial transactions.23 However, the evolution of
separate commercial laws and need for revisions hampered uniformity to
“modern commercial practices.”24 Consequentially, the purpose of the
UCC’s enactment would later be characterized as “(1) to simplify, clarify,
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”25 The idea surfaced that each phase of a commercial
transaction was so closely intertwined, from start to finish, which called for
grouping those differing transactions into a single subject of commercial
law.26
As a novel project, compiling commercial subjects into the original
Code required both funding and time commitment from those involved.27
19. See infra Part I.B.2.
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. U.C.C. general cmt. at 3 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
22. Id. at 2. Those acts included the following: Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896);
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (1906); Uniform Sales Act (1906); Uniform Bills of Lading Act
(1909); Uniform Stock Transfer Act (1909); Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918); and Uniform
Trust Receipts Act (1933). Id. at 2–3.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2017).
26. See supra note 21, at 3. “A single transaction may very well involve a contract for sale,
followed by a sale, the giving of a check or draft for a part of the purchase price, and the acceptance of some form of security for the balance.” Id.
27. Id. at 3–4.
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The project received its main financial support from the Maurice and Laura
Falk Foundation of Pennsylvania, along with ninety-eight business affiliates
and law firms.28 The drafting process came with responsibility, as multiple
drafts were considered and debated by joint committees of both organizations at meetings.29 The drafting and editorial work of the UCC took ten
years before the first edition emerged, and an Editorial Board of advisers—
consisting of distinguished judges, practicing attorneys, legal scholars, professors, and deans of various law schools—oversaw the task.30
The Editorial Board of advisers, the Council of the ALI, and either the
Commercial Acts Section or the Property Acts Section of the Conference of
Commissioners approved the drafts before being submitted for discussion to
the ALI and NCCUSL.31 If approved, the draft came before the general
membership of the ALI and the NCCUSL.32 In addition to these final stages, special subcommittees directed the review and discussion of each article
with the purpose of providing recommendations to the Enlarged Editorial
Board.33 Informal consultants—including businessmen, operating bankers,
and a committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the American Bar Association—regularly counseled those working on
the Code.34 After final approval of the Code by the ALI and NCCUSL, and
in accordance with the NCCUSL’s practices, both bodies jointly submitted
the finalized version to the American Bar Association for approval by its
House of Delegates.35
After ten years of this prolonged process, the official text of the UCC
was promulgated in 1951 and published in 1952.36 Pennsylvania became
the first state to adopt the UCC in 1953, effective July 1, 1954.37 Over the
years, additional official texts and revisions of the UCC appeared.38 Subsequently, other states followed in Pennsylvania’s footsteps and adopted the
UCC.39 In 1961, the ALI and NCCUSL established the Permanent Editorial
Board (“PEB”) to provide explanatory commentary on the Code, with the
28. Id. at 3. Notably, the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation contributed a total of $275,000
to the preparation of the Code. U.C.C. report no. 1 (PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. 1962).
29. See supra note 21.
30. See supra note 21, at 4. Esteemed Judge Herbert F. Goodrich of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit served as the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the 1952 edition.
Id.
31. See supra note 21, at 4.
32. See supra note 21, at 4.
33. See supra note 21, at 4–5. The special subcommittees were assigned to one article each.
Id. at 4.
34. See supra note 21, at 7–8.
35. See supra note 21, at 8.
36. See supra note 21, at 2, 4.
37. See supra note 21, at 2.
38. U.C.C. report no. 1 (PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. 1962).
39. Id.
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intention of encouraging uniformity in response to states putting forth their
own amendments.40 Currently, all fifty states and U.S. territories have
adopted some version of the UCC.41
2. The Emergence of the “Good Faith” Standard: Governing the
Behavior of Parties Under the Uniform Commercial Code
Within Article 1 are general definitions and principles of interpretations present throughout all parts of the text—one of those important principles being “good faith.”42 The concept of good faith arose from language
stipulating that every contract or duty within the UCC imposed an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement, adopting a critical notion from common law contract theory.43 This concept applied both broadly
and narrowly, including governing the option to accelerate at will; the right
to cure a defective delivery of goods; the duty of a merchant buyer who has
rejected goods to effect salvage operations; substituted performance; and
the failure of presupposed conditions.44 The standard of good faith also applied to the course of dealing between parties and parties’ usage of trade.45
There is no independent cause of action for breach of good faith under the
UCC; rather, failure to perform or enforce a duty or obligation in good faith
constitutes a breach or makes unavailable, under certain circumstances, a
remedial right of power.46 The doctrine of good faith simply allows for a
court to interpret the commercial context in which contracts are created,
performed, and enforced.47
In Article 1, the UCC described how to define the obligation of good
faith.48 Former Section 1-201(19) defined good faith as “honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned.”49 This definition applied throughout
the UCC except for in Article 2’s former Section 2-103(1)(b), where the
40. Id.
41. See Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. Prestige Equip. Corp., 949 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ind. 2011) (noting that the UCC has been adopted by all fifty states, although not entirely uniform from state to
state).
42. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2017); see also Lisa D. Sparks, The Regression of “Good Faith”
in Maryland Commercial Law, 47 U. BALT. L. F. 17, 18 (2016).
43. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2017).
44. U.C.C. § 1-203 official cmt. (2000). The obligation of good faith is now referred to in
Section 1-304. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2017).
45. U.C.C. § 1-203 official cmt. (2000). For more information about course of dealing and
usage of trade, see also U.C.C. § 1-303(b)–(c) (2017) (“A ‘course of dealing’ is a sequence of
conduct concerning previous transactions . . . that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. . . . A ‘usage of
trade’ is any practice or method . . . having such regularity of observance . . . to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”).
46. U.C.C. § 1-304 official cmt. (2017).
47. Id.
48. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2000).
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definition of good faith combined honesty in fact with “the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”—a combination of both subjective and objective standards.50 However, Article 2’s definition of good faith applied to transactions solely within the scope of said
Article and to merchants only, limiting its reach.51 Over time, other Articles
adopted Article 2’s concept of good faith, including both subjective honesty
and objective commercial reasonableness.52 Article 2A incorporated Article
2’s standard, while other Articles broadened the applicability of good faith
beyond merchants to all parties.53 Articles 2 and 2A were eventually
amended to extend the good-faith standard to non-merchants as well.54 Only Article 5, which maintained the subjective component only, and Article 6
(in the few states that have chosen not to remove the Article) were without
the two-part standard of good faith.55
In 2003, the UCC again revised Article 1’s definition of good faith to
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing.”56 The reasoning behind this amendment came from the multiple cross-references of the subjective-objective definition in nearly every
Article and the need for clarifying the scope of Article 1.57 This change applied to all definitions of good faith throughout the UCC, including the recently revised Articles (except for Article 5).58 As of 2018, only eight states
(including Maryland) have declined to adopt the subjective-objective standard of good faith set forth by Section 1-201(b)(20) of the UCC, and instead
prescribe good faith to mean “honesty in fact” or “honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned.”59

50. Id. § 2-103(1)(b); see also id. § 2-102 (“Unless the context other requires, [Article 2] applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction . . . intended to operate only as a
security transaction nor does [Article 2] impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers,
farmers or other specified classes of buyers.”).
51. U.C.C. § 1-201 official cmt. 20 (2017).
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 20 n.26 (detailing the Uniform Law Commission’s
Reporter Notes behind the rationale for the change of the good faith definition in Article 1).
54. U.C.C. § 1-201 official cmt. 20 (2017).
55. Id.
56. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2003).
57. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) official cmt. 20 (2017).
58. Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 20.
59. Hawaii follows an “honesty in fact” definition of good faith. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
490:1-201(b) (LexisNexis 2009). Aside from Maryland, the following states tack on the additional language of “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”: Alabama, Idaho, Illinois,
New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 7-1-201(b)(20) (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO
CODE § 28-1-201(b)(20) (2013); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 1-201(b)(20) (West 2009); N.Y.
U.C.C. LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (McKinney 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-201(b)(20) (2015); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 401.201(2)(k) (West 2017).
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B. The History of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code
1. Nearly Fifty Years of the Trickle-Down Effect: The MUCC’s
Evolution Following Enactment and UCC Amendments
Enacted in 1963, the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (“MUCC”)
took effect on February 1, 1964.60 The purpose of the enactment was to incorporate the UCC into the Annotated Code of Maryland, providing legal
uniformity with respect to certain commercial transactions.61 A decade later
in 1975, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the new Commercial Law
Article, formally designating leading Titles 1 through 10 as the MUCC and
amending various provisions of the Annotated Code of Maryland.62 Currently, there are twenty-three titles within the Commercial Law Article,
covering an expansive list of topics including consumer protection, debt
collection, and property.63
Identically to the UCC, the MUCC outlines general provisions, definitions, and principles of interpretation in Title 1.64 Under Section 1-201, the
explanation of “good faith” appeared as a result of the MUCC’s imposition
of an obligation of good faith in every contract or duty.65 At the time of enactment, and as it stands today, good faith was defined as “honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned.”66 This definition applies throughout the MUCC except for in Title 2 governing sales.67 Former Section 2103(1)(b), now “Reserved,” provided that “‘[g]ood faith’ in the case of a

60. S.B. 77, 1963 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1963). The MUCC was formally known as Article
95B at the time of its enactment. Id.
61. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-103 (LexisNexis 2013) (outlining the purpose and policies of the MUCC as “(1) [t]o simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; (2) [t]o permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) [t]o make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions”).
62. H.B. 26, 1975 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1975); see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 17–18, n.
4. The UCC refers to its sections as “articles,” but the language is synonymous with the MUCC’s
use of “titles.” To date, the categorization of the MUCC titles is as follows: Title 1: General Provisions; Title 2: Sales; Title 2A: Leases; Title 3: Negotiable Instruments; Title 4: Bank Deposits
and Collections; Title 4A: Funds Transfers; Title 5: Letters of Credit; Title 6: Bulk Transfers; Title
7: Documents of Title; Title 8: Investment Securities; Title 9: Secured Transactions; and Title 10:
Effective Date and Repealer.
63. See generally MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11–23 (West 2013) (comprising the other
topics of the Commercial Law Article).
64. For a list of the general provisions, see generally id. § 1.
65. Id. § 1-304. There is no separate cause of action for breach of the good faith duty under
Maryland law. Marland v. Safeway, Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 135647, at *11–12 (4th Cir. Jan.
17, 2003).
66. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (LexisNexis 2013).
67. Id. § 2 (West 2013) (containing no definition of good faith).

AchilihuFinalBookProof (Do Not Delete)

2018]

“DISHONESTY” IN FACT

6/25/2018 11:01 AM

1211

merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”68
As the amendments of the UCC trickled down to the MUCC over the
years, Title 2’s interpretation of good faith—both subjective honesty and
objective commercial reasonableness—found its way to other Titles.69 Title
2A simply adopted Title 2’s standard, while Titles 3, 4, 4A, 8, and 9 expanded the applicability of the standard to all parties rather than just merchants.70 Only revised Title 5 retained just the subjective “honesty in fact”
component, and Titles 6 and 7 contained no definition of good faith.71 The
result of these dispersed conditions was that where the subjective-objective
definition did not appear in specific language, Title 1’s subjective definition
governed the applicability of good faith.72
2. Maryland’s Statutory Erasure of Commercial Reasonableness in
2012
In 2012, the Maryland General Assembly unanimously enacted revisions to the MUCC via passage of House Bill 700, which incorporated remnants of the UCC’s revisions to Article 1 in 2003.73 Titled “Commercial
Law—Uniform Commercial Code—Revisions to Title 1,” the bill stated the
following purpose:
[R]evising, updating, reorganizing, and clarifying Title 1 of the
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (MUCC) relating to general provisions applicable to the MUCC; . . . clarifying the transactions to which Title 1 of the MUCC applies; . . . defining certain terms; altering and repealing certain definitions; making
conforming changes to certain provisions of the MUCC; and generally relating to the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code.74
The House Economic Matters Committee introduced and first read
House Bill 700 on February 8, 2012.75 In its initial stage, House Bill 700’s
definition of good faith under Section 1-201 changed to “except as other68. U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (2000). Compare MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-103(1)(b) (West
2013), with Tatum v. Richter, 280 Md. 332, 337, 373 A.2d 923, 926 (1977) (“[U]nder § 2-103(b),
when the seller is a merchant, ‘honesty in fact’ has the additional meaning of ‘the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”)
69. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201 cmt. 20 (LexisNexis 2013).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
74. Id.
75. Id. In Maryland, the legislative stages of a bill are divided: (1) drafting of the bill; (2)
introduction or first reading; (3) committee hearing, where testimony can be heard to determine
amendment; (4) second reading; (5) third reading, where a roll call vote is taken; (5) passing to the
second house for approval; (6) resolution of differences; and (7) action by the governor.
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wise provided in Title 5 of this article, [good faith] means honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”76
This change made the following sections with identical language unnecessary and accordingly replaced each with “Reserved” placeholders: Sections
2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), 8-102(a)(10), and 9-102(a)(43).77
Sections 2A-103(3) and 4-104(c), which contained the expanded good-faith
provisions, were deleted altogether.78
Prior to the Committee Hearing on House Bill 700, the House of Delegates received a letter in support of the bill from the Chair of the Uniform
Commercial Code Subcommittee of the Business Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association, K. Lee Riley, Jr.79 Mr. Riley wrote, “Reasonable commercial standards are added to the definition of ‘good faith’, providing an objective and fairer standard for courts to enforce. . . .”80 He also
outlined the general basis of his support of House Bill 700:
House Bill[] 700 . . . update[s] the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code to make it consistent with the most recent version[] of
the Uniform Commercial Code Article[] 1. . . . [This revision
was] developed . . . to conform to modern business practices and
to address a number of problems that have arisen over the past
several years. Commercial law has been the providence of state
law since the formation of the United States. However, as our
commerce has become more global it is increasingly essential that
commercial law be uniform. That may be achieved through coordinated cooperation of the states and jurisdictions . . . . Accordingly, it is important for Maryland to complete the updates of the
UCC to maintain and preserve the role of state law in commercial
transactions.81
The Committee also received a letter from the Commissioner of the
Maryland Commission on Uniform State Laws, Steven N. Leitess, who
more or less provided the same support, stating: “In the interest of maintaining the vitality and vigor of state law responsive to changing business prac-

76. H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (first reading).
77. Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 20.
78. H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (first reading); see also Sparks, supra note
42, at 20.
79. Letter from K. Lee Riley, Jr., Chair, UCC Subcomm. of the Bus. L. Sec., Md. St. Bar
Ass’n, to Brian Feldman, Del., Md. H.D. concerning H.B. 700 and 713 (Feb. 21, 2012) (on file
with the Maryland Department of Legislative Services and the Maryland Law Review).
80. Id. at 2. Following his letter, Mr. Riley attached an exhibit titled “Why States Should
Adopt the Revised Uniform Commercial Code, Article 1–General Provisions (2001),” listing revisions relating to scope, applicability of supplemental principles of law, course of performance, and
the Statute of Frauds. Id.
81. Id.

AchilihuFinalBookProof (Do Not Delete)

2018]

“DISHONESTY” IN FACT

6/25/2018 11:01 AM

1213

tices and technology, it is most important that Maryland’s UCC laws are
current and up to date.”82
During House Bill 700’s Committee Hearing on February 21, 2012,
both Delegate Feldman and Mr. Riley testified in favor of the bill, citing the
reasons outlined in the letters of support.83 Subsequently, a representative
on behalf of the Maryland Bankers Association testified in objection to the
change of the meaning of good faith.84 The representative expressed concern with the substitution of the “dishonesty” standard with reasonable,
“commercial standards that exist in the marketplace.”85 The representative
did not further articulate why this change concerned the Maryland Bankers
Association.86
Following the committee hearing, an amendment to the good faith definition was introduced.87 The amendments eradicated reasonable commercial standards from Title 1’s definition of good faith, leaving merely “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”88 However, the
amendment failed to reestablish the two-prong standard that had been reserved or removed from certain sections in the first reading of the bill.89
Following the hearing, the Committee read House Bill 700 for a second
time on March 17, 2012, and the House of Delegates passed the amendment
shortly thereafter.90
House Bill 700’s legislative history does not expound on the reasoning
behind the failure to adopt the two-prong good faith standard.91 House Bill
700’s Revised Fiscal and Policy Note also did not distinguish between Title
1’s definition of good faith in the analysis of the proposed bill and the current law segments, nor did it mention the removal of the definition in other
Titles.92 There have been no additional amendments to Title 1 passed by
82. Letter from Steven N. Leitess, Comm’r, Md. Comm’n on Unif. State Laws, to Brian
Feldman, Del., Md. H.D. 3 (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with the Maryland Department of Legislative
Services and with Maryland Law Review).
83. Commercial Law–Uniform Commercial Code–Revisions to Title 1: Hearing on H.B. 700
Before the H. Comm. on Economic Matters, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. Feb. 21, 2012) (statements of Del. Brian J. Feldman), http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/mga/play/8b1591e5-f022-4c738940-29ad8a7d4505/?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ECONOMIC MATTERS COMM., AMENDMENT TO H.B. 700, H.B. 700-863493-1, 2012
Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
88. Id.
89. H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012); see supra text accompanying notes 77–78.
90. H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
91. Id.
92. H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (Revised Fiscal and Policy Note). The
analysis segment of the report stated, “The bill alters the definition of ‘good faith’ to mean honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.” Id. While, in the segment describing the current law, “‘[g]ood faith’ is defined as honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.” Id.
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the General Assembly since 2012. As of 2018, the Maryland judiciary has
yet to encounter any cases relying on the precise definition of good faith
since House Bill 700.93
C. Measuring the Meaning of Good Faith Across Different
Jurisdictions in the Lender Liability Framework
1. The “Honesty in Fact” Standard
Along the way of each state eventually adopting the UCC into their
statutory schemes, the respective courts of those states and federal courts
have analyzed the meaning of good faith when pertaining to lender liability.94 At the time of most states’ adoptions of the UCC—many occurring
several decades ago—Article 1 contained the “honesty in fact” standard of
good faith only.95 Thus, courts reasonably evaluated UCC claims pertaining to “good faith” in accordance with that same language.
Banks, as commercial and lending entities, are subject to UCC provisions—frequently under the standard of good faith.96 In an Arizona case,
the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that where a bank accepted checks
bearing stamped endorsements, despite violating the bank’s own established
procedures, such actions did not constitute a lack of good faith under Arizona’s “honesty in fact” code standard.97 Although the bank in question
had a policy against immediate credit on large checks, the court found there
was no evidence that the bank’s officer acted fraudulently or dishonestly
through their actions.98 Similarly, the Florida District Court of Appeal held
that a where a bank wrongfully debited its corporate customer’s accounts in

93. Since the 2012 amendment, there have been very few cases that address good faith in the
MUCC context at all. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Nextday Network Hardware Corp., 73 F.
Supp.3d 636, 640–41 (D. Md. 2014) (discussing good faith purchasers under Title 2).
94. See generally U.C.C. CASE DIG. (West, eds. 2009) (providing up-to-date coverage of all
50 states interpreting and applying the UCC).
95. See infra Part I.A.2.
96. Id.
97. Valley Bank of Nev. v. JER Mgmt., 719 P.2d 301, 306–07 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). The
bank failed to obtain a corporate resolution from the payee-depositor authorizing checking accounts and naming authorized signatories, against its own policy. Id. at 306. One of the bank officers also made a decision to give the payee-depositor immediate credit on the checks, against
directions and personal instinct. Id. The court’s focus was not on the possible violation by the
bank of its own procedures in establishing the corporate checking account on the payee’s behalf,
but on the conduct of the bank officer in permitting an immediate credit to the account for the endorsed checks. Id.; see also City of Phoenix v. Great W. Bank & Tr., 712 P.2d 966, 971 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985) (rejecting the appellant’s claim of the appellee bank’s lack of good faith by differentiating between lack of good faith and negligence).
98. Valley Bank of Nev., 719 P.2d at 307. The court reasoned that the bank officer’s actions
were due to his desire to protect the interests of the bank, relying on the drawee bank’s oral assurances that the checks would be paid. Id. There were no triable factual issues on the question of
the bank’s good faith. Id.
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disregard of its corporate resolution requiring the signature of two officers,
there was no bad faith on the bank’s behalf when considering Florida’s definition of good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”99 Although the bank failed to discover its oversight and had not
yet begun enforcing the two-signature requirement until it had invested
$500,000 in the corporation, the court held such actions did not show bad
faith.100 The court based its ruling on the bank’s subjective state of mind
only, not considering any lack of commercial reasonableness.101
Courts have also analyzed the “honesty in fact” good faith standard
when banks deal with “insecure” or “at will” acceleration clauses. One
court found that a bank acted in good faith in exercising the option to accelerate at will when an agent of the bank (namely a creditor) acted on what
they believed they knew, whether or not what they believed was accurate in
terms of insecurity and called for additional collateral.102 Other courts
found that it made no difference that the facts ultimately established that the
creditor was wrong and payment was not impaired—relying on whether the
creditor acted honestly, not reasonably.103
The honesty in fact standard has also been referred to as “honesty in
intent” by some courts.104 The Supreme Court of Minnesota accepted the
definition of good faith as “honesty in fact or put another way, honesty in
intent” in a check kiting scheme.105 As a subjective test, it required “hones99. Espirito Santo Bank of Fla. v. Agronomics Fin. Corp., 591 So. 2d 1078, 1079–80 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1989)). This case considered on appeal
what kind of damages should have been awarded for the bank’s actions. Id. at 1079. The bank
conceded to negligently debiting the accounts upon the signature of just one corporate officer, and
the lower court awarded consequential damages and damages consisting of the improperly debited
items. Id. The appellate court found that awarding consequential damages was inappropriate because absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the bank, the measure of damages should have
been limited to the amounts of the items wrongfully transferred. Id. Although Florida’s specific
statute did not define “bad faith,” the court held that bad faith is the lack of good faith. Id. at
1080.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Tr. Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
103. Jackson v. State Bank of Wapello, 488 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 1992). But see Barlett
Bank & Tr. Co. v. McJunkins, 497 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (explaining that a promissory note stating that in order to accelerate due to insecurity, a bank had to “reasonably” consider
itself to be insecure, was indication of a requirement of a rational basis for the bank’s determination of insecurity in contrast to a mere subjective belief that payment or performance was impaired).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 105–110.
105. Town & Country State Bank of Newport v. First State Bank of St. Paul, 358 N.W.2d 387,
392 (Minn. 1984). A check kiting scheme involves the abuse of a bank’s procedure allowing customers to write checks on “uncollected funds.” Id. at 389. Uncollected funds in an account represent funds posted to that account for deposited checks drawn on a separate bank but which have
yet to be paid for said bank. Id. at 390. The process involves the depositary bank forwarding an
accepted check to its clearinghouse, then to the drawee bank—a process that normally takes two
days. Id. A customer who is short of funds can obtain an interest-free “loan” within those two
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ty of intent rather than absence of circumstances which would put an ordinarily prudent holder on inquiry.”106 The trial court found that there was
evidence supporting that the bank had neither acted in bad faith nor acted
with any dishonest intent to shift the kite loss to other banks.107 Another
case mentioned the honesty of intent test where a bank took from a corporation—in whose assets the bank had a security interest—cashier’s checks
given by the plaintiff for the purchase of the corporation’s business and endorsed by the corporation’s president.108 The court found that the bank
should be held to the honesty in fact standard only and had no duty to inquire into the potentially irregular nature of the transaction.109 There was
no indication that the bank had failed the honesty of intent test.110
A shift in the interpretation of “honesty in fact” occurred in J.R. Hale
Contracting Company v. United New Mexico Bank at Albuquerque.111 In
this case, a debtor brought suit claiming the bank had wrongfully accelerated a $400,000 promissory note despite a pre-existing relationship of excused late payments.112 The court held that when a bank accelerates payments under a promissory note because it believes “in good faith” that the
debtor’s prospect for repayment is impaired, Section 1-208 of the UCC required the application of a subjective standard of good faith rather than an
objective standard of commercial reasonableness.113 Nevertheless, the court
held that the determination of the ultimate fact (i.e. whether the bank lacked
a good faith belief in the impairment of its prospect for repayment) should
be based on facts and circumstances surrounding the acceleration and not
solely on the bank’s testimony concerning its state of mind.114
The result of J.R. Hale meant that even under a subjective test of good
faith, when the trier of fact evaluates the credibility of a bank’s claims, the

days by waiting for the check to clear, writing a series of bad checks for deposit and withdrawal
and thus creating fraudulent credit for the preceding check. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Eldon’s Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287
(Minn. 1973)).
107. Town & Country State Bank of Newport, 358 N.W.2d at 392. Rather, the bank’s actions
were an attempt to “carry” a long-established banking relationship with a customer who had previously rectified overdraft situations to see if the cash flow problem could be resolved. Id.
108. Leininger v. Anderson, 255 N.W.2d 22, 25–26 (Minn. 1977).
109. Id. at 29–30.
110. Id. at 29.
111. 799 P.2d 581 (N.M. 1990).
112. Id. at 583–84. The company had been a customer of the bank for approximately eleven
years prior to this case. Id. at 583. During that time, the company entered into several revolving
credit notes with the bank in increased amounts each time. Id. The bank continued to renew the
notes on or about the due date despite the company’s frequent late payments. Id. at 583–84. On
those occasions, the bank never took action other than contacting the company to request payments be made up to date, which the company complied with. Id. at 584.
113. Id. at 591.
114. Id.
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fact-finder may take into account the reasonableness of that claim.115 Consequently, the conduct and credibility of the bank may be tested by objective standards subject to proof and conducive to the application of reasonable expectations in commercial affairs.116 The ruling in J.R. Hale signaled
the change to come, thirteen years later, to the UCC’s definition of good
faith.117
2.

The Incorporation of the “Observance of Reasonable
Commercial Standards of Fair Dealing” Standard

The 2003 amendment to the UCC’s definition of good faith catapulted
most of the fifty states’ emulation of such standard within their own
codes.118 Yet many years prior to the amendment, some courts had already
incorporated commercial reasonableness into the good faith standard. In
states that chose to adopt the change, their respective courts adjusted their
analysis to include the objective, commercial reasonableness standard.119 In
K.M.C. Company v. Irving Trust Company,120 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lender who refused to continue
funding a line of credit under a loan agreement was nonetheless liable for
lack of good faith when it failed to notify the borrower prior to termination
and the borrower’s business collapsed.121 The court stated that the demand
provision was subject to a good faith standard of reasonableness and fairness.122 The court first examined the lender’s subjective beliefs about the
borrower’s financial situation.123 The court cautioned that such beliefs need
not be correct, but must be reasonable.124 If the lender’s view was indeed
reasonable, the court analyzed the reasonableness of the lender’s response
to the situation; the lender’s actions would not violate the good-faith obligation so long as they represented the actions of a reasonable lender under
similar circumstances.125 The court held that although the loan officer rea115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra Part I.C.2.
118. See supra text accompanying note 59.
119. Id.
120. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 760.
122. Id. “The demand provision is a kind of acceleration clause, upon which the Uniform
Commercial Code and the courts have imposed limitations of reasonableness and fairness.” Id.
123. Id. at 761–62 (stating that if the loan officer’s subjective beliefs were dispositive, the evidence would have likely been insufficient to support a breach of good faith).
124. Id. at 761. “While it is not necessary that [the loan officer has] been correct in his understanding of the facts and circumstances pertinent to his decision not to advance funds . . . to find
that he made a valid business judgment in doing so, there must at least be some objective basis
upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion would have acted in that
manner.” Id.
125. Id. at 761–62.
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sonably believed certain facts about the borrower’s weakened financial
condition, he did not act reasonably in refusing to advance the funds without prior notice, and thus violated his obligation of good faith.126
Two years later, in 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit considered whether a bank lacked good faith when terminating
a credit arrangement in Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc.127 In this
case, the plaintiffs entered into a $25,000 credit agreement with the bank.128
After three months, the bank abruptly discontinued its line of credit once
receiving false information that the borrowers were mismanaging their
business.129 As a result, the plaintiffs lost their home and business.130 Although the good faith standard at the time only included “honesty in fact,”
the trial judge concluded that the good faith test was to include an objective
standard of reasonableness, which the defendant challenged.131 Despite a
loan agreement containing various provisions rendering the note payable on
demand after enumerated events, the First Circuit held that the bank’s failure to both warn the borrowers before terminating further credit advances
and negotiate alternative solutions with the borrowers constituted bad
faith.132
While the above cases do not encompass all outcomes in cases involving the good faith standard in relation to banks, the trend is certain: when a
bank’s action is called into question within an “honesty in fact” jurisdiction,
the bank’s own subjectivity of its actions takes precedence over any reasonable commercial practices. As a result, borrowers and other plaintiffs may
be unsuccessful with bringing claims against banks, even in egregious situations. However, jurisdictions that include the addition of objective, commercial reasonableness to the definition of good faith often impose some
level of accountability against banks where necessary. The stark difference
between courts' analyses of the singular and two-prong classifications, and
the ensuing impact on consumers, serves as a compelling reason for all
states to adhere to Article 1’s current definition of good faith.
II. ANALYSIS
This Part argues that Maryland should adopt the UCC’s 2003 amendment to Article 1 in its entirety. Part II.A discusses how good faith under
Title 1 of the MUCC, in its current state, fails to adhere to the basic (and

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 763.
821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
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arguably most important) principle of uniformity advanced by the UCC.133
Next, Part II.B posits that the vague, subjective notion of “honesty in fact”
pales in comparison, when interpreted by the courts and others, to the twoprong standard including the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.134 Part II.C explains how the MUCC’s definition of
good faith opens the door to abuse by banking institutions, and why
amendment to Title 1 should be welcomed by all, including banks.135 Finally, Part II.D advances possible theories as to why the Maryland legislature
has failed to amend Title 1 to Article 1.136
A. Maryland’s Departure from Article 1 Disrupts Uniformity Amongst
States, Undermining the Essential Purpose of the Uniform
Commercial Code
The structure of the American legal system permits each state to implement laws that are deemed best for that state, either through administrative, judicial, or legislative procedure.137 As a result, state law is only applicable within that particular state’s jurisdiction.138 Through a state’s
legislative process, an opportunity for adoption of critical uniform laws
arises.139 Although uniform laws set exemplary guidelines for states to follow, state legislatures may elect to reject them, enact them in entirety, or
enact them with modifications.140 Yet, there are a number of subject matters that necessitate adherence to uniform laws in all states.141 Perhaps as
one of the most prominent examples, commercial transactions almost always transcend state lines in one way or another.142
Article 1 is arguably the most critical of the UCC, setting the stage for
the interpretation of other Articles. Article 1’s goal is to achieve uniformity
by providing definitions and general provisions that apply as default rules
covering commercial transactions throughout the UCC, absent conflicting
133. See infra Part II.A.
134. See infra Part II.B.
135. See infra Part II.C.
136. See infra Part II.D.
137. An
Overview
of
the
Uniform
Commercial
Code,
LAWINFO,
https://resources.lawinfo.com/business-law/an-overview-of-the-uniform-commercial-code.html
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
138. Id.
139. Deanna Barmakian & Terri Saint-Amour, Uniform Laws and Model Acts, HARV. L. SCH.
LIBR. (May 9, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://guides.library.harvard.edu/unifmodelacts.
140. Id.; see George A. Hisert, Uniform Commercial Code: Does One Size Fit All?, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 219, 219 (1994) (“[O]ne of the basic precepts of federalism is the individual state’s
ability to experiment with alternative solutions to problems commonly shared with other states
and to address those which may not exist in other states.”).
141. See Acts, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx (last visited Apr. 13,
2018) (listing all of the completed acts by the Uniform Law Commission).
142. See supra note 137.
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provisions.143 In commenting, the original drafters stressed the point of the
Uniform Commercial Code: “Uniformity throughout the American jurisdictions is one the main objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot be
obtained without substantial uniformity of construction.”144 The Permanent
Editorial Board for the UCC thoroughly disapproved of non-uniform revisions to states’ versions of the UCC, advocating for uniformity throughout
state statutes regulating commercial transactions.145 A crucial part of uniformity is looking toward other jurisdictions’ analyses when interpreting
provisions of the UCC.146 With the vast, intricate set of topics governed by
the UCC, and the large amount of cases concerning good faith, some semblance of consistency is needed.147
The official comments of the UCC suggest practical guidelines for the
interpretation and application of UCC provisions to commercial transactions.148 The 2003 revision to Article 1 sought to maintain clarity in the
midst of shifting business practices and advancement of the law.149 Of the
many revisions, the change of good faith’s meaning under Section 1-201 to
mean “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” aligned with the definition of the previously amended
Articles.150 Furthermore, implementing the objective standard when measuring good faith substantially affects a court’s determination whether good
faith exists in cases falling under the entire UCC, not just individual arti-

143. UCC Article 1, General Provisions (2001) Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%201,%20General%20Pro
visions%20(2001) (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
144. U.C.C. general cmt. at 2 (2017). The Comment’s purpose was to “aid in viewing the Act
as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction.” Id.
145. Joint Committees: Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (PEB),
AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/committees/joint-committees/ (last visited Apr. 13,
2018).
146. Brooks v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, 57 So.3d 1153, 1159 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
147. Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and
Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 561 (2006) (listing the number
of cases from 1945 through 2004 in which the phrase “Implied Covenant of Good Faith” appeared); see also Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But (Still) Not Yet Duplicated, Revised
UCC
Article
1
(Aug.
15,
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/RA1.081511.pdf (describing how uniformity “levels the
playing field” across jurisdictions).
148. Denise R. Boklach, Commercial Transactions: U.C.C. Section 1-201(19) Good Faith—Is
Now Time to Abandon the Pure Heart/Empty Head Test?, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 647, 650 (1992); see
also Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc. 630 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980) (rationalizing that the purpose of
the official comments to the UCC is to promote uniform construction of the UCC).
149. See supra note 143. Article 1’s revision underwent several changes of a technical, nonsubstantive nature as well, such as the reordering and renumbering of sections and adding genderneutral terminology. Id.
150. See supra note 143.
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cles.151 Simply put, Article 1’s revisions finalized the UCC’s movement
toward modernization.152
Where there are deviations from the UCC, there should be a rebuttable
presumption in favor of “uniformity for uniformity’s sake.”153 Although
those variations may not affect individual transactions, such variations inconvenience courts and lawyers who must stay informed of their existence
and the implications of non-uniformity.154 For instance, the drafting of
documents or selection of governing law in multistate transactions would
require attorneys to identify and compare each state’s definition, and then
select the best option for their client—steps that are undoubtedly timeconsuming.155
Banking transactions are rarely ever limited to or regulated within the
confines of one state, rather crossing state lines in a myriad of ways, and litigation from one dispute can very well arise in multiple jurisdictions.156
Maryland remains one of the few number of states without Article 1’s definition of good faith.157 Thus, the commercial standard by which Maryland
banks conduct business should adhere to those other states for the sake of
uniformity. By adopting Article 1 in full, Maryland’s definition of good
faith will be in line with other jurisdictions and truly further the purpose of
the UCC.
B. “A Pure Heart and an Empty Head”158: Standing Alone, the
Subjective Prong of Good Faith Remains Difficult to Determine
and Triggers Confusing Interpretation
Since the implementation of the UCC, many cases have centered on
the question of whether parties exercised good faith in a variety of transactions.159 More recently, good faith theories have appeared in every stage of
151. Why
States
Should
Adopt
UCC
Article
1,
UNIF.
L.
COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UCC
%20Article%201 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
152. Id.
153. Hisert, supra note 140, at 226–27.
154. Id. at 227.
155. Robert Levine, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Part 1, BLOGSPOT
(Apr. 30, 2015, 8:07 AM), http://ucc-madeeasy.blogspot.com/2015/04/good-faith-under-uniformcommercial.html.
156. Sparks, supra note 42, at 24 (explaining the ramifications of Maryland’s current law).
157. See supra text accompanying note 59.
158. Me. Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727 A.2d. 335, 340
(Me. 1999) (referring to the subjective standard of good faith as “the pure heart and empty head”
standard); see also Seinfield v. Commercial Bank & Tr. Co., 405 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.) (noting that the Florida version of the UCC “seem[s] to protect the objectively stupid so
long as he is subjectively pure at heart.”).
159. See generally U.C.C. CASE DIG. (West, eds. 2009) (providing up-to-date coverage of all
50 states interpreting and applying the UCC).
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the lending relationship, from loan negotiation to retaking collateral to extending lines of credit.160 To determine the meaning of good faith, one must
bear in mind the following considerations: (1) the specific language under
Section 1-201; (2) additional language under applicable articles; and (3) official comments to the statute.161
How a court construes the meaning of good faith under the MUCC,
and in other states with solely the subjective standard, can be seemingly arbitrary.162 Gauging “honesty in fact” is an “essentially subjective test which
focuses on the state of mind of the person in question.”163 Essentially,
courts must ascertain the thought process of individuals, and often corporations as well, and whether they were truthful and behaved honestly, from
their own perspective.164 But how does one effectively prove a dishonest
state of mind of an individual, let alone a business entity?
Prior to Revised Article 1, the UCC did not provide instructions to the
courts on how to interpret this “white heart” test.165 The ensuing confusion
strips good faith of any practical meaning, rendering it nothing but an empty expression and diminishing its value where it is most needed.166 The
subjective standard is vague at best, functioning as “too limited to be taken
seriously in the performance and enforcement context . . . .”167 Furthermore, the subjective standard provides no guidelines to a court for a bank’s
behavior where its honest intent blurs the lines with negligence or lack of
diligence. A single good faith definition will clarify confusion as to which
standard applies in the multiple subjects that are governed by the UCC.168
For example, Maryland courts would no longer need to differentiate between a merchant or a non-merchant to determine the relevant standard of
good faith.169

160. Paul Matthew Jones, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 LA. L. REV. 1181,
1185–86 (1988).
161. Boklach, supra note 148, at 650.
162. Id. at 647 (stating “[i]n some respects, good faith is a bit like obscenity, i.e., the judge
knows it when he sees it.” (referencing a quote by Justice Stewart in his attempt to define obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964))).
163. Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 425 F.2d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2005); Prenger
v. Baker, 542 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa 1995) (“This definition has been universally interpreted to
require a wholly subjective test examining what the party actually believed at the time of the
transaction.”).
164. Rowley, supra note 147, at 4.
165. The subjective standard of good faith has been alternatively coined the “white heart” test.
Eldon’s Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282,
287 (Minn. 1973).
166. Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1994).
167. Id.
168. Boklach, supra note 148, at 676.
169. Id.
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In order to serve its purpose, good faith “requires some objective
standard tied to commercial reasonableness.”170 Without such an objective
standard, good faith has no logical meaning. There may be differing opinions as to what exactly reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing are,
as even courts within the same district often reach different conclusions
based on the particularized facts and evidence.171 There will always be potential barriers to predicting the outcome of cases.172 However, adding an
objective component should only lead to more equitable outcomes.173 Ultimately, the purely subjective standard does not account for the actions of a
reasonable individual, and gives leeway to actions that are offensive but not
definitively dishonest.174 The standard also fails to consider how UCC
transactions should embody fairness and commercial reasonableness.175 It
sensibly follows that commercial transactions falling underneath the MUCC
should include objectivity; otherwise, there is no ascertainable benefit in
having the standard at all.176
C. Standing Alone, the Subjective Standard Tips the Balancing Scale
of Justice in Favor of Banks, Leaving Lender Liability Unchecked
Lender liability cases typically involve a bank’s abuse of its institutional power over a borrower in order to protect its own interests.177 Extending a good faith obligation to the lender-borrower relationship serves as
an effective means of addressing the potential abusive practices of banks.178
An alarming trend in cases decided solely under the subjective standard
170. E. Allen Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 671 (1963). But see Jones, supra note
160, at 1196 (“In an unstable industry, with a diverse group of lenders, a reasonable standard may
be difficult to ascertain.”).
171. Boklach, supra note 148, at 686.
172. Id.
173. Id. But see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-3, at 1089–90 (2d ed. 1980) (positing that the result of
most cases would be the same under either good faith standard).
174. William H. Lawrence & Robert D. Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in
Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63 IND. L. J. 825, 833 (1988); see Farnsworth, supra
note 170, at 672 (“Both common sense and tradition dictate an objective standard for good faith
performance.”); id. at 674 (limiting the definition of good faith to honesty in fact alone left the
concept “enfeebled”).
175. Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 174, at 833.
176. Id.
177. Kenneth J. Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653, 654 (1988).
“[E]ven the most sophisticated borrower is subject to the discretionary judgment of a lender under
many loan agreements, a situation in which the lender may potentially abuse its institutional power.” Id. at 665–66 (footnote omitted). See generally State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 686 (Tex. App. 1984) (noting that the borrower established economic duress
by showing that the lender implied that the loan would be called if a former CEO, disliked by the
lender, resumed management of the borrower company).
178. Goldberg, supra note 177, at 657.
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shows that banks were often not held accountable for their behavior if a
court determined they acted with “honesty,” even where the consequences
were detrimental.179 Examples of banks violating their duty of good faith
include: exercise of undue control over the borrower’s business; improper
acceleration of a note and/or declaration of default; failure to provide advance notice of a default or termination of credit; creation of excuses to
avoid extensions of credit or advances on funds; improper exercise of offsets; adding additional loan conditions; improper foreclosure and disposition of collateral; and not providing reasonable notice to cure defaults.180
From the beginning stages of drafting the UCC, advocates for the
banking industry played a large role in its developments—particularly the
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association.181 Without surprise, banking advocates have baulked at the
idea of incorporating the objective reasonableness standard—resistance that
spans more than half a century.182 During the drafting and revision process,
the concept of good faith (which included variations of an objective component) faced criticism for allegedly creating an impossible standard for
brokers, banks, and similar institutions to observe at all times.183 Thus, the
standard was abandoned to alleviate concerns of business people and business lawyers alike.184 Commentators believed that the “moralistic” nature
of the concepts of “good” and “bad” faith have led to a “sue the bank” mentality, making banks a favorable target by plaintiffs during economic turmoil.185 In recent times of nearly all states’ conformity with Article 1 of the
UCC, there has been no clear explanation by Maryland’s banking advocates

179. See supra Part I.C.1.
180. Brian Mahany, Bank’s Duty of Good Faith, JUDGE LANG & KATERS & MAHANY L.,
https://www.lenderliabilitylawyer.com/video.php?article=brian-mahany-good-faith-lender_57
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
181. Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 113, 113 (1951).
182. The 1951 ABA committee report, which objected to the objective standard of good faith,
expressed concern that including such would require courts to invoke difficult considerations of
usages of trade, customs, and practices. Walter D. Malcolm et al., Report of Committee on the
Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 119, 128 (1951); see, e.g., Werner F. Ebke & James R.
Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 SW. L. J. 775, 798
(1986) (asserting that duty of good faith “provides no objectively identifiable guidelines concerning the bounds of legally permissible conduct. . . .” and it is “inconsistent with the basic notion of
fairness that notice be given as to what activities are legally permitted or prohibited.”); Loeb H.
Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Application of Old Concepts, 104
BANKING L. J. 492, 499 (1987) (stating that the obligation of good faith has been at times misused
by borrowers “as a specious weapon for recovery”).
183. Malcolm et al., supra note 182, at 131.
184. Id. at 127.
185. See Mark Snyderman, What’s So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance
Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1988); Granoff, supra note
182, at 515.
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as to why adding the objective definition is not in the best interest of commercial practices for all.186
The subjective standard of good faith has faced substantial criticism in
the creditor-debtor context, one being that the standard grants creditors excessive leeway that imposes a difficult burden of proof on the debtor.187 As
one judge adequately phrased this concern:
[A] purely subjective test is subject to arbitrary abuse. It would
allow a creditor to be unreasonable and place the debtor in an unjust position since the creditor might at any time call the entire
debt and require the debtor to prove the non-existent state of mind
of the creditor. Thus, under this interpretation, the code would
permit a creditor to destroy a viable contractual relationship without requiring him to justify his actions.188
For example, where insecurity clauses are present, the subjective
standard of honesty of fact is undoubtedly insufficient to balance the interests of both parties. “A declaration of insecurity is a unilateral decision
made by the creditor which places a severe hardship upon the debtor. This
hardship is unjust if the creditor’s decision is unreasonable or based upon
mistaken facts which the creditor may honesty believe to be true.”189 Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the original UCC drafters, warned against the
use of insecurity clauses as a “charter of irresponsibility” for creditors.190
Simply put, in a space where consumers enter commercial contracts with
less bargaining power and control, the subjective definition can be problematic and is more advantageous to banks.191 Incorporating a commercially reasonable objective standard is a fairer standard for courts to enforce
against all parties.192

186. See supra text accompanying notes 84–86.
187. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (Garrard, J., concurring); see also Goldberg, supra note 177, at 679 (arguing that the K.M.C. standard
of good faith will deter malicious lender actions while a wholly subjective approach will not).
188. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 329 N.E.2d at 626 (footnotes omitted).
189. Richards Eng’rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. App. 1987).
190. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1197 (1965).
191. Jones, supra note 160, at 1195. Another concern of the subjective test is how the borrower is also subjected to their lender’s risk adversity, an uncontrollable factor, by being forced to
behave in a manner that will not alarm their lender. Id.; see also Lending Liability Lawyers,
JUDGE, LANG & KATERS AND MAHANY L., https://www.lenderliabilitylawyer.com (last visited
Apr. 13, 2018) (stating that banks have too much power and large businesses are at their mercy).
192. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) cmt. 20 (2017) (“Although ‘fair dealing’ is a broad term that must
be defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the
care with which an act is performed. This is an entirely different concept than whether a party
exercised ordinary care in conducting a transaction.”). But see Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on
the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L. J. 619, 637 (1981) (arguing that the ambiguity of an
expanded good faith definition would cause remedies to be administered arbitrarily and unevenly
by courts).
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Another concern is the possibility of contract drafters for banking entities, who have the freedom to create their own forms and terms, employing
choice of law provisions that allow them to select Maryland law, which
would reduce their level of accountability.193 Forum shopping may also run
rampant.194 In most commercial contracts or transactions, consumers rarely
have the ability to bargain either choice of law or the forum—provisions
left to commercial entities’ choosing.195 In all, the very nature of a consumer’s relationship with a bank is one of unequal power.
Maryland’s banking industry and its advocates should not fear an abrupt change to the standard of good faith for three reasons. First, imposing
an objective standard can be beneficial to individuals and banks by providing determinate procedures as a defense to any claims, preventing frivolous
lawsuits.196 The purpose of the UCC’s requirement of good faith can be
traced back to protecting parties’ expectations of the agreement, and the objective standard can help courts frame the reasonableness of those expectations.197 Second, guidelines exist to assist financial institutions with meeting the objective component of the good faith standard within the assorted
topics covered by the UCC.198 Third, incorporating the objective standard
will not negate the subjective portion—a bank may still operate on subjective beliefs in its decisionmaking, but with an objective limitation that curtails improper actions by the bank.199 The days of banks behaving with lit193. Sparks, supra note 42, at 24–25.
194. Id. at 25. Forum shopping is the practice of litigants selecting courts most likely to provide a favorable judgment by employing a forum selection clause, which courts tend to enforce
when concerning commercial agreements. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 253 (2018).
195. Marty Gould, The Conflict Between Forum-Selection Clauses and State Consumer Protection Laws: Why Illinois Got It Right in Jane Doe v. Match.com, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 699
(2015) (discussing how the forum-selection and choice of law clauses in contracts can cause the
“wholesale displacement of state consumer protection laws”); see also James J. Healy, Consumer
Protection Choice of Law: European Lessons for the United States, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
535, 535 (2009) (pointing out how American courts do not always apply the public policy violation exception in consumer contracts, often leaving consumers unprotected).
196. Burton, supra note 166, at 1535. But see Snyderman, supra note 185, at 1338 (arguing
that the objective portion of the good faith standard, in a lender liability context, “upset[s] the reasonable expectations of the parties and significantly limit[s] the flexibility available to lenders and
borrowers in furtherance of commercial transactions.”).
197. Jones, supra note 160, at 1191.
198. Mark E. Wilson & Jeremy D. Kerman, What is Good Faith? Subjective and Objective
Standards for Banks Accepting Payment Orders, A.B.A. BANKING L. COMM. J. (Mar. 2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201203/wilsonkerman.pdf (pointing out that the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council established
guidelines for meeting the objective component in regards to funds transfers, especially Internet
schemes such as “phishing” frauds).
199. Jones, supra note 160, at 1196 (“Put another way, certain actions of the lender, such as
foreclosing when fully secured and when the borrower was not in default, invade too far the expectations of the borrower.”). But see Farnsworth, supra note 170, at 672 (questioning the need
for an objective test if a court, in attempting to evaluate the credibility of a claim, also considers
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the claim even under the honesty-in-fact test).
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tle repercussions are long gone, and with lender liability continuously
evolving, judges and juries are no longer privy to finding all actions of a
bank as just and fair.200
D. Maryland as a Lone Wolf: Potential Theories as to Why Maryland
Has Yet to Adopt Article 1
The Maryland legislature has never shied away from adopting parts of
the UCC, embracing Article 1 (in-part) along with every other Article within the UCC. Why, then, has the Maryland legislature chosen to apply the
two-prong standard of good faith to Title 2 only, effectively subjecting
merchants to a different level of judicial scrutiny unlike most other jurisdictions? This question invokes a number of theories. Perhaps it was an unintentional oversight, as evidenced by the House Bill 700’s Fiscal and Policy
Note.201 The definition of good faith within the Fiscal and Policy Note’s
analysis portion (which is meant to describe the proposed changes to any
bill) did not differ from the definition found in the current law segment
(which is meant to state the law as it stood prior to any amendments).202
Perhaps this discrepancy was a drafting error, meaning that the legislature’s
intention was to include the subjective-objective definition all along.
Another theory involves the challenging landscape of Maryland’s
banking industry, still combating low interest rates, increased regulatory
demands after the recession, and pressure from shareholders.203 As a state
with many community-based banks, constant regulatory and legislative
changes would require additional funding to accommodate additional training.204 Perhaps it is more beneficial to Maryland banks (and those who advocate for them) to avoid any changes to comply with the UCC while still
undergoing a recovery process, if ever at all. Furthermore, Maryland, a
state recently recognized as one of the most undesirable places to start a
business, faces mounting pressure to become more business-friendly.205
200. See JUDGE, LANG & KATERS AND MAHANY L., supra note 191. But see Snyderman, supra note 185, at 1338 (“[Objective reasonableness] creates a needless presumption that allows
judges and juries to substitute their conceptions of reasonableness and fairness for those of parties
more knowledgeable about the realities of the market. The inconsistent application of the good
faith doctrine to lending practices adds uncertainty and other costs to business transactions in abrogation of the fundamental purposes of commercial law.”).
201. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. Carrie Wells, The Number of Community Banks in Maryland is Shrinking, BALT. SUN
(Oct. 16, 2015, 9:08 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-bank-mergers-20151016story.html.
204. Id.
205. Jeffrey Ferguson, Opinion, Can Larry Hogan Keep Maryland Open for Business?,
WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/can-larry-hogan-keepmaryland-open-for-business/2016/02/19/32a56d90-cea1-11e5-88cd753e80cd29ad_story.html?utm_term=.7531148f22dc; Jeff Jeffrey, Md. Ranks Among Worst States
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Banks are businesses, and perhaps keeping Maryland’s statutory standards
as they are is a way to promote an “open for business” atmosphere that will
deter businesses—even banks—from leaving the state and boost the confidence of business leaders.206
III. CONCLUSION
Maryland remains one of the few states that has not adopted amended
Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code, maintaining the definition of
good faith as “honesty in fact in the transaction or conduct concerned.”207
As a result, the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code does not promote its
intended purpose of uniformity in relation to other jurisdictions, specifically
where commercial transactions frequently transcend state lines.208 If courts
are to rely on the sole subjective definition of good faith, confusion and
varying interpretations ensue due to the empty-headed and vague concept.209 Case law has shown, more often than not, that the subjective standard leaves room for dishonest practices amongst banks and weakens lender
liability, leaving troubling circumstances for those affected.210 The Maryland General Assembly should amend Title 1 to comply with Article 1’s
definition of good faith, adding in the objective standard of observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, as nearly all other states
have done. Doing so will promote and uphold uniformity, provide a clearer
standard for courts to enforce and for parties to measure, and ensure fairness amongst all parties involved in a banking relationship.

to Start a New Business, Two Studies Find, BALT. B. J. (July 6, 2017, 11:04 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/2017/07/06/md-ranks-among-worst-states-to-start-anew.html (calculating Maryland’s ranking by looking at the overall business environment, access
to resources, and business costs).
206. Ferguson, supra note 205 (describing how government officials of Maryland are trying to
improve its image and job climate); Jay Steinmetz, Md. should look to Va. for business example,
BALT. SUN (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:20 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op1008-steinmetz-column-20171004-story.html (describing how some measures proposed by Maryland legislators caused bad publicity and poisoned relations with the business community).
207. See supra Part I.B.2.
208. See supra Part II.A.
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. See supra Part II.C.

